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Zenkich: US & Irish Abortion Law

X MARKS THE SPOT WHILE
CASEY STRIKES OUT: TWO
CONTROVERSIAL ABORTION
DECISIONS
Sabina Zenkich*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of abortion rights incites a consummate fire storm
of controversy fueled by the passions of those rallying under the
opposing banners of "pro-choice" and "pro-life." That controversy is exacerbated by the judicial process when the courts are
faced with crucial decisions about the content and scope of a
woman's right to choose an abortion over a full-term pregnancy.
In 1992, abortion law witnessed the treatment of two critical and
divergent cases: Attorney General v. Xl from Ireland and
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey2
from the United States.
The Supreme Court of each nation found it necessary to
complicate the jurisprudence of abortion doctrine, obscuring the
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. I thank Professor Steve
Shatz of the University of San Francisco School of Law for helping me develop the idea
for this article, Professors Anthony Whelan and Gerry Whyte of Trinity College School
of Law, Dublin, Ireland for all of the research material and guidance they provided and
Professor Susan Kupfer of Golden Gate University School of Law who taught me how to
write a good law review article. I also thank my issue editor, Rosanne Calbo-Jackson for
her tireless reviews of this article, editor Jessica Rudin for her input and especially editor
Donna Kotake for her help and support which were invaluable to me in accomplishing
this feat. Finally, I thank my parents, Nijas and Asima Zenkich, who always urge me to
strive for the superlative in all of my endeavors and my fiance, Dan Nugent, without
whose encouragement I would not be a writer for the law review.
1. ATIORNEY GENERAL V. X AND OTHERS. JUDGMENTS OF THE HIGH COURT AND SUPREME COURT, (S. McDonagh ed., The Incorporated Society of Law Reporting for Ireland
March 1992) [hereinafter Xl.
2. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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nature of abortion laws which had previously been relatively
straightforward. Each court manipulated its respective abortion
law to reflect its own ambivalence between accommodation to
the political and social pressures of each country and the justices' subjective beliefs about abortion. In its own way, each decision represents an unsuitable use of judicial power to impart
subjective policy as well as denigrate Supreme Court adherence
to stare decisis.
In X, the Irish Supreme Court considered Irish abortion law
in the context of a pregnant girl's attempt to procure an abortion in England. The Court found that although Irish law
strictly proscribes the right to abortion in most situations, an
exception is possible if a pregnancy presents a real and substantial risk to a pregnant woman's life. s The Irish justices held that
the pregnant girl in X could not be prohibited from procuring
an abortion, the justices having made a determination that her
life was at such risk, although the girl herself was the risk.·
In Casey, the United States Supreme Court adjudicated the
legality of a series of abortion regulations in Pennsylvania. The
plurality opinion upheld four significant regulations which hinder a woman's access to abortion by mandating that a doctor
provide a pregnant woman with "anti-abortion" literature prior
to abortion, that a woman wait twenty-four hours before an
abortion can take place, that a minor obtain parental consent to
have an abortion unless such a minor obtains a judicial decree
allowing the abortion and that abortion facilities provide detailed reports of their abortion activity to the state. G However,
the plurality opinion struck down a regulation requiring that
pregnant women notify their husbands before procuring
abortions. 6
This article studies and defines abortion law in Ireland after
X and in the United States after Casey. It addresses how these
decisions affect Irish and American women's rights, respectively,
to secure an abortion. It also scrutinizes the justices' opinions
and criticizes the reasoning for their holdings.
3.
4.
5.
6.

X at 60, 88, 10!.
Id. at 62, 89, 97, 10!.
Casey at 2832, 2867-72 (plurality opinion) (3-4-2 decision).
Id. at 2832, 2843-54, 2838-43 (plurality opinion) (3-2-4· decision).
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This article argues that both Courts changed their nations'
straightforward abortion laws to reach decisions that the courts
felt would be more palatable to their respective political constituencies and satisfy their own subjective beliefs. On the one
hand, the Irish court declined to abide by the traditionally conservative position denying abortion rights as codified in the Irish
Constitution. 7 Rather, motivated by humanitarian concerns for
the individual defendant in this situation, the Court pursued a
more liberal interpretation of Irish abortion law. The Irish
Court, therefore, broadened the law so more women would be
eligible to procure abortions. On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court vitiated the liberal standards of Roe v. Wade. 9 Although, it re-articulated Roe's basic holding, the Court left
women vulnerable to state intervention which will impinge their
abortion rights.
Courts should recognize a woman's right to choice in the
matter of abortion because each individual woman should be
able to control her own body and life without input or intervention from a moralistic and subjectively-inclined judiciary. Therefore, the Irish Court's liberalizing approach to Irish abortion law
in X was superior to the American Court's restrictive disposition
towards American abortion law in Casey.

II.

ATTORNEY GENERAL v. X

Attorney General v. X involved an Irish girl who, with the
help of her parents, attempted to secretlylO secure an abortion
outside of Ireland. l l However, her efforts to do so were thwarted
by the Irish authorities when they learned what the girl planned
to do. 12 She and her parents decided to challenge the authorities
ori this matter in the Irish courts. 13 This case quickly caught the
7. See infra note 32.
8. This standard was liberal in that it allowed women to procure abortions relatively free from state intervention. State intervention in abortion activity could only pass
constitutional muster if it met the strict scrutiny standard. See infra note 219.
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that right to abortion is
grounded in constitutional right of privacy). This article considers only one aspect of the
Casey decision: how Casey debased Roe.
10. See infra note 23.
11. X at 9.
12. Id. at 9-10.
13. Id. at 10.
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attention of the Irish (as well as international) media and triggered passions on both sides of the abortion issue, both before
and after the Irish Supreme court ruled in the girl's favor.
A.

CASE ANALYSIS

1.

Facts

The main party in this case was a fourteen and a half year
old girl, X, who had a playmate whom she frequently visited at
the playmate's home. 14 Unknown to anyone, the playmate's father had been molesting X since before she had reached her
thirteenth birthday. 111 In December 1991, the father had nonconsensual sexual intercourse with her, and consequently she became pregnant. 16 On January 27, 1992, she finally told her parents about the crimes committed against her by her friend's
father during the preceding year and a half.17 Also on that day,
X's doctor informed her and her parents that X was pregnant. IS
She "naturally was distraught and upset. "19 X told her mother
that when she discovered she was pregnant, she wanted to throw
herself down some stairs and kill herself. 20
The gardai (Irish police) were informed of the crimes
shortly thereafter 2l and took a full statement after X's doctor
confirmed her pregnancy.22 A short while later, X and her parents decided she should have an abortion and would go to England for that purpose. 23 They told the gardai of their plan and
left for England a few days later.24 While in England, they
learned that a court had ordered an injunction against their intended course of action, and they voluntarily returned to Ireland
to fight the injunction. 211
14. Id.
15.Id.
16.Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20.Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
England to
24.Id.
25. Id.

at 9.

at 10.
at 9.
Due to the close proximity of the two countries, Irish women often go to
receive secret, legal abortions.

at 10.
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On the journey back from England, X told her mother that
she "had wanted to throw herself in front of a train when she
was in London and that ... she would rather be dead than continue as she was."26 On a few other occasions, X expressed similar death wishes. 27
A clinical psychologist examined X and filed a report on her
condition. 28 He found that while X "was cooperative, she was
emotionally withdrawn, . . . in a state of shock and had lost
touch with her feelings," and that although she did not seem
depressed, "she 'coldly expressed a desire to solve matters by
ending her life.' "29 He believed that X was capable of killing
herself, "not so much because she is depressed but because "she
could calculatingly reach the conclusion that death is the best
solution. "30 The doctor concluded that if X were to carry the
child, it would be "devastating" to her mental health and "considerable" to her psychological well-being. 31
2.

Procedural History

On February 6, 1992, the Attorney General filed a plenary
summons against X and her parents requesting an order restraining the defendants from violating rights guaranteed to the
unborn under Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution,32 an injunction restraining X from leaving Ireland for nine months or
other period specified by the court, and an order restraining X
from obtaining an abortion. 33 The High Court34 issued a preliminary injunction on the summons, and the defendants subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal with the same court. 35 The
parties and the High Court agreed that the hearing on the mo26. [d.

27. [d.
28. [d.
29. [d.
30. [d. at 10-11.
31. [d. at 11.
32. The Constitution provides, "The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws
to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its law to defend and vindicate that right." IR.
CONST. art. 40, § 3(3).
33. X at 8.
34. [d. This court is analogous to a United States federal district court.
35. [d.
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tions be treated as the case on the merits. 36
a. The High Court's Decision and National Law
The High Court judge believed that the courts must recognize the mother's right to life equally with the fetus's right to
life (as required by Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution).37 Here,
however, he found that the mother's life was threatened by the
mother herself. He deemed this risk to be of a "different order
and magnitude" than the certainty that the fetus would die if an
injunction were not granted. 38 Therefore, in this balance, the
High Court judge decided an injunction should not be granted. 39
Furthermore, he opined that even though Irish law declares a
Constitutional right to personal liberty [including the right to
travel],40 this right cannot be abused "to commit a wrong"41
(e.g., going abroad to obtain an abortion). He concluded that, in
such a case, the courts could prevent a person from doing [such]
a wrong even if it means restricting one of that individual's personal rights. 42
b. The High Court's Decision and European Community
(EC) Law43
The High Court judge noted that, although EC law must
36. [d.
37. [d. at 14. See supra note 32.
38. [d. See supra note 32.
39. [d. at 14-15.
40. The Supreme Court Justices never cite the authority for the right to travel in X.
The right to travel is not expressed in the Irish Constitution, rather it is a common law
creation. As a recent Supreme Court case declared, the right to travel is a non-expressed
or unenumerated right (stemming from the constitutional right to liberty). Murray v.
Ireland, 1991 I.L.R.M. 465 (1991).
41. [d. at 15.
42. [d.
43. Ireland, being a Member State of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) has certain responsibilities to the EEC. One of the Treaty's
cardinal requirements is that restraints on the freedom to provide services within the
EEC are to be abolished. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
IEEC TREATY) art. 59. The European Court of Justice (the judicial branch of the EEC)
has decided that abortion is a service. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v.
Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (lr. 1991). However, the Court of Justice has not decided
whether abortion may be excluded from the Treaty's requirement that restrictions on
services be abolished because of its controversial nature to some Member States. (International law and its effects on the decisions in X and on Irish abortion law overall is
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normally prevail over Irish law,44 the EC has made exceptions to
this rule. He discussed one important exception: if a Member
State's public policy, public security or public health is at risk, it
may deviate from EC law in this area in order to prevent that
risk. 411 EC law would not likely deny a Member State. [Ireland
being one] an exemption to an EC decree based on that Member
State's particular moral obligation to its citizens [e.g., Ireland
protecting the lives of the unborn as required by its ConstitutionJ.46 Thus, the High Court judge concluded that, in this situation, a national law would preempt EC law, and, therefore, an
injunction could issue against X leaving Ireland to procure an
abortion. 47
The Irish Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision. Four of the five Supreme Court justices decided that an
injunction should not issue in this case. 48 The sole dissenter
would have permitted it.49
Additionally, the four justices in the majority agreed that
when the right to life (of the fetus) is balanced against the right
to travel in this case, the former does not automatically prevail
over the latter. In fact, they decided that the right to travel
should prevail in this case. IIO
B.

LAWS RELEVANT TO THIS CASE

Numerous Irish legal and political issues were involved in
this case. They were further complicated by international legal
and political factors.
1. Irish Law

The main Irish law at issue in this case was Article 40.3.3 of
the Irish Constitution which provides: "the State acknowledges
discussed infra.)
44. X at 15.
45. [d. at 16.
46. [d. at 18.
47. [d. at 19.
48. [d. at 62, 89, 97, 10l.
49. [d. at 83.
50. [d. at 64, 94, 97, 102.
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the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal
right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and,
as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that
right. "III
Another fundamental law at issue in X was the right to
travel which all of the justices agree exists in Irish law. 1I2
The final "local" law cited in X was a 1939, common law
case from England, Rex v. Bourne. 1I3 In that case, a fifteen year
old girl had been raped and consequently became pregnant. 1I4 A
doctor openly performed an abortion on the victim and was
charged with "unlawfully procuring the abortion of the girl"
under section 58 of the Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861. 1111
The Bourne court had decided that in order for the defendant
doctor to be proven guilty, the prosecution would have had to
unequivocally show that the doctor did not perform this surgery
only to save the victim's life. 1I6 The Bourne court had determined that preventing the victim from becoming "a physical and
mental wreck" was one of the possible maladies from which the
defendant could have spared the victim by performing the abortion. 1I7 Although this case had come from a jurisdiction other
than Ireland, the Irish Supreme Court apparently deemed it sufficiently persuasive precedent to cite it favorably in the X
decision.

2. International Law
International law plays a large part in Ireland's jurisprudence because the Irish government ratified the European Convention on Human Rights ll8 and Ireland is a member of the
51. IR. CONST. art. 40, § 3(3).
52. Gerry Whyte, Abortion and the Law, in DOCTRINE AND LIFE 264 (Gerry Whyte et
al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter Whyte).
53. Rex v. Bourne, 3 All E.R. 615 (K.B. 1939).
54. [d. at 619.
55. [d. at 615. Section 58 of the Act provides," Every woman being with child who,
with intent to procure her own miscarriage . . . and whosoever, with intent to procure
the miscarriage of any woman . . . shall be guilty of felony. " X at 100, citing the Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861, ch. 100, § 58 (Eng.).
56. Bourne at 616.
57. [d. at 619.
58. Once a nation ratifies this Convention, it must abide by the Convention's ex-
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a. The European Convention On Human Rights (ECHR)
The ECHR's provisions define the term "human rights" and
establish what ECHR members' duties are with regard to human·
rights. 60 The ECHR's court, the Court of Human Rights (CHR),
determines whether human rights are being violated in specific
situations. All Member States of the EC are parties to the
ECHR and "there is no doubt that the rights protected by the
ECHR are [European Economic Community] human rights."6!
Among the ECHR~s many provisions, three are most relevant to the abortion issue and the X case: the right to life,62 the
right to privacy63 and the prohibition against inhuman and degrading treatment of people. 64 The ECHR also contains some
law pertaining to the right to travel: the Fourth Protocol to the
ECHR says that one "has the right to leave one's country," but
there has been very little case law in this area. 611
Even if there are no express provisions in the ECHR regarding a particular issue, that issue may still fall within the ECHR's
jurisdiction if the CHR determines that one or more of its provisions are underlying aspects of the main issue. 66 For example,
although there are no provisions regarding abortion per se in the
ECHR, abortion may still fall within the ECHR's jurisdiction.
The sections of the ECHR discussed above are some of the areas
at issue in cases involving abortion. 67 They are relevant to Irish
abortion law because an EC Member State's legal decisions repress provisions as well as the decisions of the Court of Human Rights. Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Preamble,
arts. 1, 45, 53, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
59. Ireland has certain obligations to the EEC by being a member. As a member, it
must refrain from jeopardizing the achievements of the Treaty's objectives. EEC TREATY
art. 5.
60. ECHR Preamble, arts. 2-18.
61. T. C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ·EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 137 (2d ed.
1991) [hereinafter Hartley].
62. ECHR art. 2.
63. ECHR art. 8.
64. ECHR art. 3.
65. Whyte at 264.
66. ECHR arts. 49-50.
67. See infra notes 100-107 and accompanying text.
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garding issues that deal with human rights could be influenced
or altered by the ECHR. Since Ireland is a member of the EC, it
must abide by ECHR provisions and decisions if and when the
CHR gives a ruling. 68
b.

The Treaty Establishing The European Economic Community (EEC)

The EC was established to ensure the economic and social
progress for the Member States 69 "by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe."70 The Treaty further
provides how the EEC's economic and social goals are to be
met. 71 Some of the current EC laws which govern Member
States are the provisions in the EEC,72 decisions made by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ)73 and directives issued by the
Commission and Council 74 of the EEC.711 Therefore, since Ireland is a member of the EC, it must abide by the above.
Article 59 of the EEC Treaty prohibits Member States from
imposing restrictions on EC citizens who wish to provide services in the EC.76 Article 60 defines "services."77 The ECJ decided that performing an abortion is a service within the meaning of Article 60. 78 In Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro,79
the ECJ expanded the parameters of EC law by extending the
right to travel to "any national who seeks to cross a border and
68. Hartley at 137.
69. The Member States to the Treaty are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom.
70. EEC TREATY Preamble.
71. EEC TREATY arts. 1-248.
72. EEC TREATY art. 5.
73. See supra note 43.
74. EEC TREATY art. 4. The Commission and Council are legislative-type branches
created by the EEC. EEC TREATY arts. 145, 155.
75. EEC TREATY art. 189.
76. EEC TREATY art. 59.
77. "Services" includes activities of craftsmen, the professions, etc. EEC TREATY art.
60.

78. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v. Grogan, 62 C.M.L.R. 849 (lr.
1991).
79. Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, 3 C.M.L.R. 52 (Italy 1985), cited in
James Kingston & Anthony Whelan, The Protection of the Unborn in Three Legal Orders - Part III, IRISH LAW TIMES, July 1992 [hereinafter Kingston & Whelan, Part III].
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has the means to pay for some sort of service. "80 The Council
reinforced the ECJ's decision in Luisi in Directive 73/148/EEC
which requires Member States to abolish restrictions on people
traveling to other Member States to obtain services. 81
Thus, Irish law on abortion, as decided in X, seems to be in
direct conflict with EC law in this area. Irish women ostensibly
cannot be restricted from traveling abroad to procure an abortion under EC law because EC law supersedes national law. 82
However, this apparent conflict between the laws is illusory because Article 56 of the EEC Treaty as well as Article 8 of Directive 73/148 allows a Member State to deviate from the Treaty
and Directive, respectively, on grounds of public policy.83 The
Supreme Court did not address this in the X decision because it
allowed X to travel to England to abort her fetus. 84 Nevertheless, the High Court judge who would not have allowed X to
travel to England to secure an abortion, felt that the treaty required him to address this issue. 8t1
In addition, new EC law may soon play an important role in
the abortion issue. A plan to unite the EC into a federation, with
all federal laws (not just economic ones) superseding Member
State's laws, is scheduled to become effective as soon as it is ratified by the Member States86 in EC national referendums. 87 This
plan, called the Maastricht Treaty, would create the United
States of Europe and was to become operative in January 1993. 88
However, not all of the Member States had adopted it as
planned, which made meeting the January 1993 deadline impossible. For example, in June 1992, the Danes voted against it,89
possibly anticipating problems arising out of Maastricht's main
80. Kingston & Whelan, Part III at 166.
81. Id .
. 82.Id.
83.Id.
84. X at 62, 89, 97, 101.
85. Kingston & Whelan, Part III at 166. X at 15. See supra notes 44, 78 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 69.
87. Matthew C. Vita, European Nations Meet to Chart Course for Unity, THE ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 9, 1991, at AI.
88.Id.
89. Jonathan Kaufman, Danish Electorate Rejects Terms of European Community
Treaty, BOSTON GLOBE, June 3, 1992, at 1.
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objective of greater economic and new political unity.90 Ireland,
however, voted in favor of the Treaty on June 18, 1992.91
However, even had the Maastricht Treaty been adopted as
planned, the Member States carved out a special exception to it
known as Protocol 17.92 Protocol 17 provides, "Nothing in the
Treaty on European Union or in the Treaties establishing the
European Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or
supplementing those Treaties, shall affect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland."93 The Protocol was enacted to resolve a political dilemma, created by disgruntled conservative as well as liberal factions, facing the Irish
government. The conservative parties behind the ratification of
Article 40.3.3 were upset with the Supreme Court for its decision
in X. The Protocol failed to appease their liberal opponents who
feared that pregnant women, whose lives were not threatened by
their pregnancies, could be restrained from leaving Ireland if the
Protocol became operative. 94
To resolve the political dilemma facing the Irish government, the Member States attached the Solemn Declaration to
the Maastricht Treaty on May 1, 1992.95 The Solemn Declaration states, "that it was and is the intention [of the Member
States] that the Protocol shall not limit freedom ... to travel
between Member States. . . ."96
C.

How X AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AFFECTS A WOMAN'S RIGHT
TO SECURE AN ABORTION
In order for Irish women to stay within the confines of the

90. Most Danes fear that accomplishing this objective would result in losing too
much of their national sovereignty, being dominated by Germany and losing social programs.ld.
91. Joel Havemann, Europe Treaty Gets Big Boost in Irish Vote, L. A. TIMES, June
20, 1992, at AI. As of the time this article was submitted for publication, France and
Germany had also approved the Maastricht Treaty. John J. WaIte, French: Yes to Union
Treaty, U.S.A. TODAY, Sept. 21, 1992, at AI. Germany Ratifies Maastricht Treaty, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1992, at A4.
92. Whyte at 256-257. The Irish government requested that the exception be included and the other Member States approved it.
93. Kingston & Whelan, Part III at 168.
94. Whyte at 257-58.
95. Id. at 258.
96. Id. at 254, citing the Solemn Declaration to the Maastricht Treaty.
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law on abortion in their country, they must grapple with a number of aspects of that law.
First, Irish national law limits abortions only to pregnant
women whose lives are at a real and substantial risk if they carry
their pregnancies to term. 97 Thus, it seems if a woman's life is
not really and substantially at risk, and she tells the authorities
that she intends to go abroad to procure an abortion, she could
be enjoined from doing so. This is true despite the existence of a
fundamental right to travel because the right to travel will usually be subordinate to the right to life (of the unborn fetus).98
Ironically, since even a pregnant woman's mere verbal threats of
suicide suffice to meet the real and substantial risk test, it seems
any pregnant woman could easily meet that burden.
The standard is rather amorphous; whether there is a real
and substantial risk to the mother's life is a matter of judgment,
so there is always room for debate. 99 As a result of the X decision, the chances are very good for a pregnant woman to convince the State that her life is at real and substantial risk by the
pregnancy, and that she should be allowed to abort.
Second, there are international pressures (the ECHR, EC
law and perhaps the Maastricht Treaty) encouraging the Irish
authorities to allow women to leave the State and obtain all legal services available in other Member States. These pressures
necessarily force Ireland toward a more liberal abortion policy.
The ECHR may play a role "in reconciling Irish abortion
laws with supra-national human rights standards."loo However,
where the Commission of the ECHR has dealt with abortion, it
has been rather evasive in its decision-making. lOl For example,
in one case, the Commission expressly refused to decide whether
97. Whyte at 259. The other limitation is that the one performing the surgery must
have a bona fide belief that the mother's life is at stake by continuation of the pregnancy. ld. at 260. This is important because "abortion providers" should know their legal
responsibilities.
98. Three of the four justices held this belief. X at 62, 97, 101.
99. Whyte at 261.
100. James Kingston & Anthony Whelan, The Protection of the Unborn in Three
Legal Orders - Part l, IRISH LAW TIMES, April 1992, at 94 [hereinafter Kingston & Whelan, Part I].
101. ld.
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an unborn life was covered by the right to life provision. l02 It
thus appeared to support abortion rights. But in another case, it
"rejected the possibility that [the right to life provision] gave an
unqualified right to life to the foetus [sic]. "103 Therefore, unless
the Commission takes a definitive stance against abortion under
the right to life provision, it apparently remains an avenue
through which the ECHR may liberalize Irish abortion law. Furthermore, the Commission could become active on the abortion
issue under the ECHR's prohibition of inhuman or degrading
treatment of people. 1M Forcing a woman to carry a pregnancy to
term, which makes her a "physical and mental wreck,"lol! could
arguably constitute such proscribed maltreatment. loe Finally, although the ECHR's "right to leave [one's country]" is relatively
weak,107 it is yet another avenue through which the ECHR can
make .decisions favoring liberal abortion laws. All of the provisions in the ECHR relevant to the abortion issue may provide
such avenues. Although the ECHR's activities regarding abortion may not have been very extensive in the past, there is no
indication this "pattern" will continue in the future. Because the
ECHR has the support of the EC behind it,108 any decisions
made by the ECHR dealing with abortion will have significance
for Irish wo~en.
EC law is tremendously important to Irish women. The majority of the Supreme Court did not address EC law in X because it felt that the case could be resolved on national law
grounds. However, the High Court justice felt obligated to consider EC law in his decision in X.I09 His nationalist approach to
EC law in the area of abortion provides good insight into how
102. [d., citing Bruggeman & Scheu ten v. Germany, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 100 (1978).
103. Kingston & Whelan, Part [ at 94-9S, citing Paton v. U.K., 19 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 194 (1980).
104. Kingston & Whelan, Part [ at 9S.
lOS. Bourne at 619.
106. Kingston & Whelan, Part [ at 9S. However, some experts feel that although the
ECHR permits abortion, it will not likely lay the ground work for intervention in the
area of abortion by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the court of the EEC. James
Kingston & Anthony Whelan, The Protection of the Unborn in Three Legal Orders Part II, IRISH LAW TIMES, May 1992, at 107 [hereinafter Kingston & Whelan, Part II].
107. Kingston & Whelan, Part [ at 9S, citing VAN DIJK AND VAN HOOF, THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 491 (2d ed., 1990).
108. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court could have decided X had it felt the necessity of using EC law in its holding. Like the High Court justice,
the Supreme Court could have decided that X did not meet her
burden of proof to be allowed to deviate from the Constitutional
law proscribing abortion - even under the (national) real and
substantial risk test that the Supreme Court majority alone
used. It then could have looked at the fundamental right to
travel (to obtain services lawfully available in another Member
State) in EC law and decided that Ireland would not be violating that supreme law based on Ireland's moral· convictions on
the subject of abortion. 110
Although the Supreme Court did not follow the High
Court's approach to abortion rights in X, based on current national and international law, Irish women are not completely
safe from future interference in their abortion rights. Ireland
could, through a successful national referendum,lll clarify Article 40.3.3 and truly restrict abortion rights to emergencies
threatening the mother's life. If that were the case, the Supreme
Court would be forced to act as the High Court did in X. The
Court would be forced to deviate from EC law, because abortion
is a subject which Ireland can adjudicate for itself on grounds of
(clear) public policy, and prevent pregnant women and girls like
X from leaving Ireland to procure abortions.
Finally, future EC law in the form of the Maastricht Treaty,
especially Protocol 17112 and the Solemn Declaration of May 1,
1992113 could affect Irish abortion rights. If the Treaty is ratified, it could seriously effect Irish abortion law. Not only do
fears of anticipated problems with the main objective of the
Treaty exist,114 but there also seems to be a conflict between the
two "amendments" to the Maastricht Treaty. Experts feel that
Protocol 17 was added to the Treaty in response to the ECJ's
decision in Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v.
Grogan which hinted that abortion clinics from abroad might be
able to distribute abortion information in Ireland. I IIi
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

X at 18.
See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
Kingston & Whelan, Part III at 169. See Society for the Protection of Unborn
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The Protocol is legally binding116 and, by itself, might have
appeased many Irish conservatives because it would seemingly
have prohibited the EC courts from tampering with Ireland's
abortion laws. However, the Solemn Declaration, although of
questionable authority, cannot be completely dismissed.
On the one hand, for reasons which are unclear, some experts feel that the Solemn Declaration does not have any legal
effect.ll7 If the Declaration is not in fact legally binding, it probably would not disturb the Irish conservatives who are pacified
by the Protocol. They could continue to feel secure because the
Declaration would not likely have any impact on EC law11s
(which would thus not effect abortion law in the EC or in
Ireland).
On the other hand, for reasons which are equally unclear,
some believe that the Declaration is now highly persuasive,119
which means that it could be strongly considered by EC courts
in any abortion case under the Maastricht federalist system. In
turn, this could have an impact on abortion law at the national
level which would be highly objectionable to Irish conservatives.
It remains to be seen which school of experts is correct in its
assessment of the Declaration's strength.
How much weight the Declaration carries will not be determined until the entire EC ratifies the Maastricht Treaty. It may
prove to have no impact on Irish abortion law as it stands today,
or it may liberalize that law tremendously. How the ECJ deals
with the Protocol and the Declaration if and when the Maastricht Treaty passes could have a significant impact on Irish
women. The ECJ's reputation for being a proponent of maintaining and expanding the EC's legal jurisdiction could result in
Children v. Grogan, 62 C.M.L.R. 849 (lr. 1991). Distribution of such material is something that would be highly objectionable to the Irish Supreme Court which expressly
rejected the idea that information about the availability of abortions abroad could be
provided to pregnant Irish women. Whyte at 255, citing Attorney General v. Open Door
Counseling, 1988 I.R. 593 (1988). Information about the availability of abortions abroad
is available only through "subversive sources." For example, women write the phone
numbers of abortion clinics in bathroom stalls, put stickers bearing abortion numbers on
cars, etc. However, it is clear that such activity is illegal.
116. Whyte at 263.
117. Id. at 266.
118. Id. at 267.
119. Kingston & Whelan, Part III at 169.
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the liberalization of Ireland's abortion laws 120 - at least on the
EC front. However, the conservatives at the national level would
certainly put up a tremendous fight before any further liberalization could take place in Ireland.
D.

THE IRISH SUPREME COURT'S SHREWD ApPROACH TO THE
ABORTION ISSUE CAUSED BY PUBLIC PRESSURE

The Republic of Ireland's political and legal traditions are
deeply grounded in Catholic dogma. 121 Conservative Catholics
were the driving force behind Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution. 122 The Irish people have long been embroiled in the abortion issue. In 1983, in an effort to prevent future challenge by
liberals, the conservatives moved to pass a constitutional law to
proscribe abortion. 123 The conservatives were successful and
thus Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution was adopted via
amendment. 124
After the enactment of Article 40.3.3 in 1983, the international media paid relatively little attention to the abortion issue
in Ireland until the X controversy began. Much of the international as well as Irish public was outraged by the High Court's
decision not allowing X to leave the jurisdiction to procure an
abortion.l2II However, many Irish conservatives supported the
High Court's decision. Consequently, the Supreme Court
maneuvered strategically to appease both sides on the abortion
issue in this highly publicized case.
1.

The Opinions of the Irish Supreme Court in X

Chief Justice Thomas Finlay is conservative 126 but prag120. Liberalization of Ireland's abortion laws would result from the ECJ's enforcement of the fundamental right to travel.
121. R. F. FOSTER, MODERN IRELAND 520, 544, 567-68, 571, 581, 594 (1988).
122. Irish Vote Puts Abortion Ban in Charter, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1983, at
A13.
123. Trying to Slam the Door: a Bitter Debate on a Dubious Abortion Law, TIME,
Sept. 19, 1983, at 42.
124. See supra note 32.
125. Dennis Duggan, Abortion Protests Shake Ireland; Court Hears Girl's Appeal,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 26, 1992, at 7. Paul Majendie, Ireland Under Spotlight over Abortion,
REUTER LIB. REP., Feb. 24, 1992.
126. The definition of a "conservative" in Ireland does not differ from its American
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matic, and he "tried to please the world [in this case]."127 The
substantive part of his decision began with a qualifier - the
court should use current "prevailing ideas and concepts"128 in its
Constitutional decision-making. 129 This premise came from dicta .
of a 1974 decision. l3O Although the legitimacy and strength of
this premise was questionable, he did not attempt to inconspicuously hide it in the text. Rather, by having boldly presented this
uncertain premise he seemed to indicate that he would be taking
certain "liberties" in adjudicating this case.
The Chief Justice used a test which allows for a pregnant
woman to abort when "it is established [sic] as a matter of
probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life of
the mother, which can only be avoided by the termination of her
pregnancy[;] such termination is permissible,131 .having regard to
the true interpretation of Article 40[.3.3] of the Constitution."132
This test was presented by the defense counsel based on the precise wording in Article 40.3.3 and the facts in X. 133 However,
there was no precedential basis for accepting this test as the appropriate standard here. The Chief Justice simply accepted it in
accordance with his own concepts of "prudence, justice and
charity."134 The Chief Justice, however, added a hurdle of his
own to the "real and substantial" test. He insisted that the risk
be to the mother's life, as distinguished from the mother's
health,1311 which the defense counsel did not expressly require in
his version. 136 It seems that the Chief Justice added this provision so as to assure conservative members of the population that
only in very limited and exacting situations could the burden be
counterpart.
127. Personal interview with Anthony Whelan, Law Professor at Trinity College
School of Law, Dublin, Ireland, July I, 1992. Professor Whelan has written numerous
articles in law journals regarding the issue of abortion in Ireland.
128. Apparently this language means current public opinion.
129. X at 59-60.
130. [d. at 58-59, citing McGee v. Attorney General, 1974 I.R. 284 (1972). Interestingly, he is the only one who introduced the prevailing ideas and concepts theory in the
X decision. Perhaps this is because the other justices do not feel it is a principle that is
appropriate here.
131. X at 60.
132. [d. See supra note 32.
133. X at 54-55.
134. Id. at 59. These concepts are along the lines of "prevailing ideas and concepts,"
which incidentally come from the same dicta in that 1974 case. See supra note 130.
135. X at 60.
136. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss3/9

18

Zenkich: US & Irish Abortion Law

1993]

U.S. & IRISH ABORTION LAW

1019

met.
The Chief Justice's version of the test might have been acceptable with respect to the underlying concepts behind Article
40.3.3 (and even with respect to the conservatives) if it were not
for his holding that the risk to X's life was real and substantial
and that she should have been allowed to have the abortion. 137
The evidence in the record in support of the defense was that X
had told her mother that she wanted to throw herself 'down
some stairs and that she was tempted to throw herself in front
of a train.13s The record did not indicate that X had actually
taken any action in preparation to make her suicide "threats" a
real possibility. The only other real evidence was the opinion of
the psychologist who examined her.139 He had found that X was
in shock, was capable of killing herself and could come to the
conclusion that she would be better off dead.140 The proof
presented in her behalf was tenuous at best.
It is difficult to believe that so little probative evidence
could meet the real and substantial risk test as laid out by the
Chief Justice, but he nevertheless held for X. Why? The only
plausible answer was that he felt the need to yield to public
pressure which demanded that X be allowed to leave the jurisdiction to obtain an abortion.l41 The Chief Justice tried to establish a vehicle - prevailing ideas and concepts - for legitimating
his entire opinion. However, this vehicle could not factually tip
the balance in X's favor. The evidence in the case alone should
have established that X should be entitled to procure an abortion, yet it was not substantial enough to have done that.
In reality, the law was too harsh on a defendant such as X.
That fact outraged the public, and the Chief Justice was apparently swept up by this public sentiment. Perhaps he also felt
137. X at 62.
138. See supra notes 20, 26, 29 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. The doctor stated that it would
be devastating to X's health and mental weI/-being if she had to carry the pregnancy to
term. Such evidence is "expressly banned" by the Chief Justice's version of the test.
[emphasis added). See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
141. Although many Irish are devout Catholics who do not believe in abortion, a
large segment of the population took a liberal stance, given the facts in this case, and
demanded that the Supreme Court overturn the High Court's ruling. See supra note 125.
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that the Court could do nothing to stop X from having the abortion, regardless of the Court's decision, as the defense counsel
seemed to hint at the outset of the proceedings. 142 Maybe he
made his decision for all of those reasons or none of them. In
any case, the main reasons which are supposed to support judicial decisions are those which have some legal and factual basis.
Very little in the Chief Justice's opinion supported his holding
that X had met the real and substantial risk burden such that
she should have been able to leave Ireland to procure an
abortion.
The Chief Justice also declared in dicta that the right to
travel is normally inferior to the right to life. 143 This concept
seemed to be the basis for a subsequent finding that this case
did not need to be referred to the European Court of Justice. 144
He felt that it could be decided under Irish law only and thus
did not need to be adjudicated under EC law, as provided in
Article 17714/', of the EEC.146 Thus, although the right to travel
issue is not relevant to the decision in X per se, it is an important aspect of EC law which could bear on future Irish abortion
cases.
The Chief Justice was possibly laying "middle ground work"
for future decisions. Many people in Ireland still hold a strong
unfavorable view toward abortion 147 - such that even other
Constitutional rights (let alone EC laws) must yield to the rights
of the unborn. The travel dicta was probably meant to keep conservatives from becoming anxious that Article 40.3.3 will become
ineffectual in light of X and potential changes in EC law. The
Chief Justice perhaps assumed that the liberals would be
pleased with the decision in X's favor and would not likely be
overly disturbed by the travel section in his opinion. Moreover,
142. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
143. X at 64.
144. Recall that the European Court of Justice is the judicial branch of the EEC.
145. "Where [questions concerning the interpretation of the EEC, the validity and
interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community, the interpretation of the
statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council ... are] raised before any court
or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision
on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to
give a ruling thereon." EEC TREATY art. 177.
146. X at 68.
147. Paul Majendie, Most Irish Want Blanket Ban on Abortion Modified - Survey,
REUTER LIB. REP., Mar. 2, 1992.
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the travel dicta was possibly also meant as a warning to the EC
that, despite this decision, the EC has a formidable legal challenge if it plans to allow the EC right to travel to prevail over
national policy.
Justice Niall McCarthy is a "known liberal."148 He began his
argument with the provocative statement that abortion always
results in the fetus's death while for the mother, even if she decides not to abort, death is only a probability, not a certainty.H9
Because of this, he believed that it could not be a question of
balancing the two lives, otherwise, the fetus would always prevail in the balance. 15o Justice McCarthy explained, however, that
the Constitutional protection of the unborn is qualified by the
requirement of due regard to the mother's life and is made even
less absolute by the provision that the fetal life could only be
vindicated as far as practicable. 151
His opinion, although grounded in the Constitution, may
not have been as legitimate as it appeared because Justice McCarthy also subscribed to the test which the defense counsel
presented without much legal basis.152 Justice McCarthy opined
that, in paying due regard to the mother's life, when there is a
real and substantial risk to her, it may not always be practicable
to vindicate the right to life of the unborn. 153 Like the Chief Justice, he gave no reason for using this particular test.
Justice McCarthy felt there was ample evidence showing a
real and substantial risk that X would commit suicide and thus
could not be stopped from aborting her fetus. 154 This finding
was not credible for the same reasons the Chief Justice's findings on this topic were not credible. 155
Finally, Justice McCarthy made a statement that the
mother could not be prevented from leaving Ireland whatever
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See supra note 127.
X at 88.
[d. He thereby addressed a legitimate conservative argument.
[d. at 89. He thereby addressed a legitimate liberal argument.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
X at 88.
[d.
See supra notes 137·40 and accompanying text.
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her purpose for so doing.1I16 This assertion was based on the reasoning that the State could not enjoin an individual from traveling abroad with the intent to commit an act which mayor may
not be criminal in that other jurisdiction. 1I17 Justice McCarthy
did not present this assertion in a way that had any bearing on
this case. Thus, his position on the right to travel seemed little
more than a personal preference for a liberal right to travel policy which substantially weakened his opinion.
Justice O'Flaherty was a surprising member of the majority
in X because ten years prior he had campaigned for the Irish
"pro-life movement!"1118 His opinion was difficult to discern because it contained numerous disconnected ideas: the Eighth
Amendment being only one of many provisions in the Constitution;1119 the Constitution being committed to freedom and justice;160 the Constitution treating the family with particular reverence [such that an injunction if granted would create an
unwarranted interference with the authority of the family] ;161
the State not being allowed to interfere with the freedom of
movement "to this extraordinary degree;"162 the State looking to
the economic needs of mothers so that it must also be concerned
with mothers' health, welfare and happiness;163 and the State
having to be positive in such a case. 16" Apparently he was trying
to create a smoke screen with all of these ideas to make a decision of "moral conscience." Such a stance was surprising coming
from a (former?) staunch pro-life individual. He must have succumbed to the general public sentiment that the mother must
prevail in this case.
Justice O'Flaherty applied a different test than the other
judges in the majority. His test provided that abortion is permissible in Ireland if it "has the effect of terminating pregnancy
bona fide undertaken to save the life of the mother . . . . "1611
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

X at 94.
Id. at 93.

See supra note 127.
X at 96.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at
at
at
at
[d. at

96-97.
97.
96.
97.
96
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Justice O'Flaherty also gave no real basis for this test. His version was no clearer than the real and substantial risk test.
He then found that the evidence supported a finding that
an abortion should be allowed in this case,188 but again he offered no reason for reaching that holding. Justice O'Flaherty
may have been moved by the facts of this case to hold as he did.
It is perfectly understandable that he would want to make his
decision in favor of X because her situation was heart-wrenching. However, Justice O'Flaherty's decision should not have
rested on predominantly emotional grounds. He should have
substantiated his opinions with more judicially valid reasons.
One of Justice O'Fl'aherty's last comments in this opinion
was that the Court should not be allowed to interfere with one's
freedom of movement to this extraordinary degree because it is
inconsistent with one of the Constitution's basic tenets: "to assure the dignity and freedom of the individual."187 This was a
legitimate stance. It was especially laudable because Justice
O'Flaherty is a known conservative and pro-life advocate but
nevertheless applied this tenet to the abortion issue. I8s
Justice Egan is "a very old man but new appointee."189 He
may be called the maverick of the group. He used a test which
provided that a pregnant woman can terminate her pregnancy if
'carrying it to term would probably involve a real and substantial
risk to the mother, and it is irrelevant if the risk comes from the
mother's threats of suicide or from any other cause. I70 It was basically the same test that the Chief Justice and Justice McCar. thy used, but this version was more liberal because Justice Egan
expressly provided for situations such as X's in the test itself.
This supported his conclusion that X met her burden, but this
test had the same problems as the other justices' tests - it had
no foundation for its existence in this opinion.
Justice Egan also stated in dicta that, in balancing Constitutional rights, the right to life [in general] might not always be
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 97
Id. JR. CONST. art. 40, § 3(2).
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
See supra note 127.
X at 101.
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paramount to other rights in every case.171 This dicta helped to
support his reason for finding for X172 in this case. He claimed
that travel ranks lower than the right to life because there is a
difference between leaving a jurisdiction to commit a crime
which is not illegal, and removing a fetus from the jurisdiction
with the stated intent to terminate the life of that fetus. 173 This
was important to him because the court has a duty to "defend
and vindicate" the right to life of the fetus, so the right to travel
cannot take precedence over that right.174 This was a reasonable
and judicially supportable position. However, it seemed inconsistent with the earlier portion of his opinion, that a defendant like
X should be allowed to travel abroad for an abortion. By having
been noncommittal here, Justice Egan failed to express a clear
position on abortion rights.
Justice Hederman, the sole dissenter, is "very conservative."17~ First, he asserted that in interpreting an article of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court must give the words their ordinary meaning with necessary consideration to the other Constitutional Articles. 176 This was a direct attack on the Chief Justice's "prevailing ideas and concepts" approach.177 Justice
Hederman made it clear that his decision would be based solely
on a strict interpretation of the Constitution. This was a recognized and legitimate stance (similar to that of Justice Black of
the U.S. Supreme Court) - if only he had remained faithful to
it.
He asserted that "the right to self-determination" cannot
supersede protection of the fetus. 178 This also was a legitimate if
not harsh posture. But by having made this assertion, he insinuated that X was seeking to preserve her bodily integrity, rather
than her life. Justice Hederman did not openly accuse her of
171. He used an example in which a father killed a man who had raped his daughter. Justice Egan felt that in such a circumstance the girl's bodily integrity prevails over
the rapist's life. I d. at 102.
172. Id. at 101.
173. {d. at 102.
174. This is true even though the mother would rarely make such intentions known
to the authorities, and it would be difficult for the courts to supervise court orders proscribing mothers from leaving the jurisdiction to obtain an abortion. Id.
175. See supra note 127.
176. X at 78.
177. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
178. X at 79.
.
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that, but it is clear that he was hostile to her cause. His position
on abortion was clear at this point. He stated that it is a
mother's "duty to carry out the pregnancy" [emphasis added],
and the State must do everything reasonably possible to preserve [fetal] life.179 He stayed true to that position by saying
that the preservation of unborn life is paramount to the
mother's right to travel. 180 But by taking such a harsh position,
he broke his promise to give the words in the Constitution their
ordinary meaning. In taking such an automatically narrow view
on abortion, he effectively rejected the express Constitutional
provision that due regard should be paid to the mother's life.
Justice Hederman then deviated from his staunch position
on abortion by establishing an abortion rights test of his own.
His test provided that the evidence necessary to allow an abortion, in order to save the mother's life, "be of such weight and
persuasion as to leave open no other conclusion but that . . .
continuance of the pregnancy will, to an extremely high degree
of probability, cost the mother her life and that any such opinion must be based on the most competent medical opinion available."18l First, this test has no apparent legal precedent. He
claimed that it stems from Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution 182
but did not explain how it stems from that Article. Second, even
by having presented this test, he was being untrue to his belief
that it is a woman's duty to carry a pregnancy to term. If that
was how he really felt, what function would such a test serve?
Th~ bottom line would always be that the mother would have to
bear the child, according to Justice Hederman's interpretation of
the law.
In any event, he found a "remarkable paucity" of evidence
to meet this standard. 183 This conclusory finding seemed to be
an ends-justifying-the-means apology for his being unfaithful to
both the Constitution and his principles.
Justice Hederman concluded that there was no certainty
that the mother would die by suicide and that it would "not be
179. [d. at 80.
180. [d.
181. [d. at 82.
182. [d.
183. Id. at 83.
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impossible" to prevent X from committing suicide and save the
fetus l84 as X had loving parents and others to support her. How
he determined that it would be possible to prevent X from committing suicide is not clear. It simply was not a realistic
suggestion. 181!
The law as a result of the Supreme Court's opinions in this
case is that a woman seeking an abortion in Ireland must prove
that there is probably a real and substantial risk to her life
which can only be prevented by the woman having an abortion.
If she can meet this burden, she will be free to travel to a jurisdiction where abortion is legal to have the procedure performed.
Although the analysis the majority of the Supreme Court
used to reach its conclusion in X was questionable, the conclusion was nevertheless correct. Allowing X to abort'was implicitly
mandated by the fundamental Constitutional provision which
requires "[that the state] assure the dignity and freedom of the
individual."186 Giving women the right to control their own bodies and destinies is at least consistent with assuring their dignity
and freedom. ,
III.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. CASEY

Planned Parenthood v. Casey involved a Pennsylvania law
in which various provisions attempted to restrict abortion rights
further than Roe or its progeny seemingly would have allowed.
However, claiming to affirm Roe's basic holding, the United
States Supreme Court upheld all but one of the abortion restrictions in the Pennsylvania law. This decision, in effect, created
new law on abortion rights. As with all U.S. Supreme Court
cases, the decision in this case was intended to be the definitive
word on abortion law in the United States, but this objective has
failed. 187
184, [d,

185, Even if X's parents could keep twenty-four hour care over her to prevent her
from killing herself, how could the thousands of other women (or girls) who do not have
such supportive loved ones be cared for? How are they to be prevented from committing
suicide? Is Justice Hederman prepared to en'gage the State in twenty-four hour care of
such woman (or girls)? If that is the case, he should have proposed a plan for how the
State would provide such care,
186, See supra note 167,
187, See infra note 264,

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss3/9

26

Zenkich: US & Irish Abortion Law

U.S. & IRISH ABORTION LAW

1993]

A.

F ACTS,

1027

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND HOLDING

In Casey, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of five provisions in the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act of 1982 as amended in 1988 and 1989. 188 The first
provision at issue required that a woinan seeking an abortion be
given "anti-abortion" information 18S before the procedure, that
she certify in writing that she is procuring the abortion consensually with the knowledge provided above, and that she wait 24
hours prior to the procedure. ISO The next provision required that
a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent before having
an abortion, but this provision allowed for a judicial bypass lSI of
this requirement. ls2 The third provision required that a pregnant woman seeking an abortion provide a signed statement saying that she had informed her husband that she was having the
procedure, but this provision contained some exceptions including medical emergencies. ISS The final provision required that
abortion facilities provide the state with certain information related to the specific abortions performed in each facility and
general abortion statistics about each facility. IS.
Before any of the provisions were to take effect, Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania (consisting of five
abortion clinics) and a doctor representing himself and a class of
doctors who perform abortions brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment stating the provisions were facially unconstitutional and injunctive relief based thereon. lSI! The District Court
held for petitioners, claiming that five provisions were unconstitutional and granted permanent injunctive relief from their enforcement. lsB The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, upholding all but the spousal notification
requirement. ls7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Casey at 2803.
See infra notes 200-201 and accompanying text.
Casey at 2803.
See infra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
Casey at 2803.
Id. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
Casey at 2803. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
Casey at 2803.
Id.
Id.
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the case on April 22, 1992.198 In a plurality opinion, it affirmed
the Court of Appeals' judgment in its opinion of June 29,
1992.199
B.

IMPLICATIONS OF CASEY TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

The Casey decision resulted in a severe interference with a
woman's right to secure an abortion in Pennsylvania. It also discouraged Pennsylvania doctors and abortion facilities, especially
public facilities, from providing abortions.
First, Pennsylvania's doctors who perform abortions must
now provide their patients seeking abortions with information
discouraging them from having the procedure performed. 20o For
example, the required information stresses the unpleasant medical aspects of abortion by including unnecessarily graphic details
about the procedure itself and risks involved with the procedure. 201 Such extensive "forced knowledge" clearly goes beyond
necessary informed consent. Nevertheless, a woman who would
rather not know specifically about the details of the abortion
procedure will be forcibly exposed to them. She may be dissuaded from undergoing the abortion due to a newly formed
aversion of and unnecessarily increased fears of procuring the
procedure.
If that information does not dissuade her, perhaps additional information about the fetus itself may change her mind.
The doctor must inform the patient of the probable gestational
age of the fetus and tell the patient about free brochures the
state offers which personalize the fetus. 202 Such knowledge could
easily evoke an emotional response from the patient toward the
fetus which she might not otherwise have possessed going into
the procedure or which she might have fought to overcome. Such
new emotions might make the patient decide against having the
procedure regardless of whether she can physically, mentally
and/or financially afford to take her pregnancy to term.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id. at 2833.
See infra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
Id. at 2833.
Id. at 2833-34.
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If this knowledge were not enough to discourage the patient
from having the abortion, the required information about the
availability of possible medical financial aid for the patient, alternatives to abortion and the right to receive child support
from the father may further dissuade her from choosing abortion. 203 Knowledge of the availability of these alternatives could
give the patient a sense of future financial aJ;ld emotional
security.
If all of the above does not dissuade her, the mandatory
twenty-four hour waiting period204 might finally make her have
doubts and change her mind because it allows all of the above
information to be processed and embedded in the patient's
mind. It also has an impact on the poor and on women who
must travel from rural communities to have the procedure. Most
of them cannot afford to lose more time to receive abortions because of their meager financial condition or their lengthy commute. Thus, the waiting period can further wear down the patient emotionally and mentally such that she will no longer
continue with the procedure. This requirement, as well as those
listed above, goes well beyond informed consent. 2011

Next, a non-emancipated minor seeking an abortion in
Pennsylvania must obtain the consent of one of her parents
before she can have the procedure performed. 206 This requirement can be bypassed only if there is a medical emergency or by
judicial decree. 207 A judge may authorize a doctor to perform an
abortion on a minor if the judge determines it is in the minor's
best interests. 208 Thus, if a Pennsylvania minor does not have a
parent's consent to procure' an abortion, if her life or health is
203. Id. at 2834.
204. Id. at 2833-34. The waiting period smacks of gender bias and is very condescending toward women. Why can Pennsylvania not trust its adult female citizens to
make responsible decisions about this medical procedure before entering a hospital? The
male citizens of Pennsylvania do not need to wait for a mandatory period of time before
undergoing vasectomies or any other medical procedure.
205. Clearly any Pennsylvania woman contemplating an abortion will be forced to
undergo a barrage of state-endorsed, anti-abortion propaganda before she can have the
procedure performed. She will thus have to prepare herself mentally for that event even
before having the abortion and still preserve enough energy to recover from the procedure physically.
206. Id. at 2834.
207. Id. at 2834-35.
208. Id. at 2835.
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not in great danger or if a judge does not give authorization for
her to have an abortion, she must carry the pregnancy to full
term.
Finally, for every abortion a doctor performs in Pennsylvania he or she must provide the state with a report including his
or her name, the name of any other doctor(s) involved in the
procedure, the county and state where the patient resides, the
patient's age, the number of the patient's prior pregnancies and
abortions, the type of procedure performed, the weight of the
aborted fetus, the gestational age of the fetus, the basis for any
medical emergency, and the patient's marital status. 209 Furthermore, a facility where legal abortions take place, whether it is a
clinic or hospital, must report how many total abortions it performs at the facility, and how many total abortions the facility
performs in each trimester of pregnancy.210 This report must be
filed on a quarterly basis. 211 If the facility received any state
funding within the preceding twelve month period before filing
the report, the report will be available for public review and copying.212 Requiring this information would obviously discourage
doctors from performing abortions in any remotely public facility out of fear of harassment from anti-abortion groups and individuals. Facilities receiving state funds may have the same concerns. Consequently, this could drastically reduce the number of
doctors and facilities willing to perform abortion in public facilities. Those who would suffer most, as a result of the reporting
requirement, are the poor women who could not afford to obtain
abortions in priv~te clinics or hospitals where most abortion activity would then likely take place.
The only "positive" aspect of the Casey decision is that
women need not give their husbands notice before having an
abortion. 213 Ironically, this barely became law. Had the swing
vote on this issue been otherwise in Casey, a married woman in
Pennsylvania would have had to notify her husband before getting an abortion and sign a statement that she had notified
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 2835-36.
at 2837-38.
at 2838.
at 2803.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss3/9

30

Zenkich: US & Irish Abortion Law

1993]

U.S. & IRISH ABORTION LAW

1031

him.214 The exceptions would have been a woman with a medical
emergency, her husband not being the father of the fetus, the
fetus being the result of an officially reported spousal sexual assault, or the notification potentially resulting in the husband or
a third person physically harming the wife. 216
Abortion provisions similar to those in Pennsylvania are capable of ratification in virtually any other U.S. jurisdiction because of this decision. Therefore, women throughout the nation
are at serious risk of similar interference with their rights, and
doctors who perform abortions and facilities which provide abortions may be deterred from continuing with their practices.
Since Casey has substantially diluted Roe,216 Pennsylvania and
other jurisdictions may attempt to write even more stringent
abortion regulations which would likely pass muster under the
Casey undue burden test.217 The Casey decision may be the
commencement of alarming changes to come in American abortion law.

C.

THE PLURALITY'S JUDICIAL DISHONESTY USEP TO ApPEASE THE
PUBLIC

The Casey plurality opinion was basically decided on three
distinct judicial approaches toward Roe. One was completely
supportive of Roe. Another supported an extremely diluted version of it. The last one overruled it.
Not surprisingly, Justice Blackmun completely supported
218
Roe and followed its reasoning exactly when deciding Casey.
He found that, based on the strict scrutiny standard articulated
in Roe,219 none of the provisions at issue could pass constitutional muster and thus had to be stricken. 220
Justice Stevens also basically supported Roe in his opinion.
214. [d. at 2836-37.
215. [d.
216. See infra notes 224-34 and accompanying text.
217. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
218. Justice Blackmun authored the Roe opinion.
219. Strict scrutiny is a standard of review which provides that state legislation,
attempting to regulate a fundamental right, may be upheld only if it is necessary to
promote a compelling state interest. Roe at 153-55.
220. Casey at 2845-54.
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He too found that none of the provisions could pass constitutional muster based on Roe or its progeny.22l
The plurality opinions which decided that the mandatory
information and twenty-four hour waiting period, parental consent and data reporting requirements were constitutional were
divided into two camps. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter
comprised one group, while the other consisted of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, White and Thomas. Although the
two sides reached the same conclusion, their approaches were remarkably different. 222
A large segment of the O'Connor group's holding was consumed by the importance of stare decisis and institutional integrity.223 The first words in the O'Connor opinion were, "Liberty
finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."224 She later stated,
"The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity. . . .
Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own
Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect
for precedent is by definition, indispensable . . . . At the other
extreme, a different necessity would make itself felt if a prior
judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its
enforcement was for that very reason doomed."225 [emphasis
added]. Justice O'Connor also stated, "The promise of constancy, once given, binds its maker for as long as the power to
stand by the decision survives and the understanding of the issue has not changed so fundamentally as to render the commitment obsolete. . . . [T]he legitimacy of the Court must be
earned over time. . . . The Court's concern with legitimacy is
not for the sake of the Court but for the sake of the Nation to
which it is responsible."226 These statements by themselves
could have been very. reassuring to those who feared this decision would overturn Roe.
However, Justice O'Connor manipulated the language

In

221. Id. at 2838-43.
222. As for the spousal notification requirement, the group drew completely opposite conclusions. Justice O'Connor's camp struck it down, id. at 2830, while Justice Rehnquist's camp upheld it. Id. at 2873.
223. See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
224. Casey at 2803.
225. Id. at 2808.
226. Id. at 2815-16.
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Roe. She and Justices Kennedy and Souter affirmed Roe's "essential holding" that a woman has a right "to choose to have an
abortion before viability without undue interference from the
state."227 [emphasis added]. However, this "undue interference"
language was not part of the decision in Roe. Roe used a strict
scrutiny standard to determine whether a state abortion regulation was unconstitutional. 228 Also, Justice O'Connor's opinion
put a greater emphasis on state power to restrict abortions after
fetal viability than Roe 229 and subsequent cases did. 230 Justice
O'Connor's group then took the "undue interference" introduction one step further and embedded it in federal abortion law by
stating, "[T]he undue burden standard is the appropriate means
of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty."231 What happened to stare decisis and
institutional integrity? How could Justice O'Connor's group
speak so elqquently of these concepts and then abruptly abandon them? It seems that these concepts were much more dispensable to this group than they had earlier proclaimed.

This group further decided that the trimester framework
was overly rigid and not part of the essential holding of Roe. 232
For these reasons, the group rejected the trimester framework. 233
Roe's critics may have thought the trimester framework was not
the best system for determining when and how a state could regulate abortions, but was it "so clearly [in] error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed?"234 This could only be
answered in the negative because the States have relied on and
used this framework for twenty years.
With these amendments to Roe, Justice O'Connor's group
proceeded to determine the validity of the challenged provisions.
The group first considered the informed consent and twentyfour hour waiting period requirements and upheld them.2311 In so
doing, these three justices overruled Akron v. Akron Center for
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 2804.
See supra note 219.
Roe at 163-65 (viability/trimester test).
Casey at 2817.
Id. at 2820.
Id. at 2818.
Id.
See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
Casey at 2822-26.
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Reproductive Health 236 which invalidated an ordinance requiring that a patient wanting an abortion be provided with information which would influence her decision so that she would
choose to carry the pregnancy to term.2S7 Akron also invalidated
a twenty-four hour waiting period. These three justices overruled Akron and an extension of it in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 238 because of "Roe's
acknowledgment of an important interest in potential life."239
Again, where is the clarity in error in Akron and Thornburgh
that their enforcement was for that reason doomed?240 In truth,
there is no such clear error in them.

Moreover, how could these three justices have allowed the
state to require that doctors give patients anti-abortion propa~
ganda?Ul Such information clearly has moralistic overtones
which stem from Judeo-Christian religious beliefs. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment242 to the United States
Constitution mandates the separation of church and state in the
federal government. This separation also applies to state governments because the Establishment Clause has been extended to
the states.243 Therefore, the state mandating the distribution of
such propaganda may be construed as unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds. Justice O'Connor's group failed to address
the religious issue at all. Instead, this group determined that the
provision passed muster based on the undue burden test. 244 This
group found that the requirement of telling a woman of the
availability of information about fetal development and state
child assistance, information that might make her choose birth
over abortion, is reasonable, not a substantial obstacle and not
236. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
237. Casey at 2823.
238. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986). In Thornburgh, a number of Pennsylvania abortion regulations were being
considered, one of which required that a woman be given written material about the
abortion, including information about fetus development. The Court struck it down us·
ing the strict scrutiny standard.
239. Casey at 2823.
240. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 201·203 and accompanying text.
242. The Constitution provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting the estab.
lishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
243. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
244. Casey at 2823·24.
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an undue burden. 246 In upholding the twenty-four hour waiting
period, this group held that decisions made after "a period of
reflection" will be more "informed and deliberate."246 In upholding these requirements, Justice O'Connor's group was being
extremely paternalistic. It was telling the American woman that
she cannot be trusted to make intelligent and informed decisions
concerning her own body without state supervision and control.
Furthermore, the group stated that "the waiting period is a
reasonable measure to implement the State's interest in protecting the life of the unborn, a measure that does not amount to an
undue burden."247 [emphasis added]. Simply by referring to the
fetus as a "life," Justice O'Connor's group made this decision
based on the Christian premise that a fetus is in fact a life - a
person. 248 This premise is not universally accepted. Furthermore, it not only violates the First Amendment Establishment
Clause but also offends Roe which explicitly rejected the concept
that a fetus is a person. 249
In considermg the parental consent provision, this group of
three justices upheld it in accordance with their interpretation
of Akron I and II, Hodgson and Bellotti II. 260 Justice
O'Connor's group stated that it would affirm a parental consent
requirement as long as a judicial bypass is available 261 which the
Pennsylvania provision expressly allows.
The group also upheld most of the record keeping provision
because "it is a vital element of medical research."262 Nevertheless, the group offered no proof that this information is or can be
vital to medical research. It does, however, increase the cost of
abortion, which the group admitted, but these justices did not
concede that it creates an undue burden. 263
245. [d.
246. [d. at 2825.
247. [d.
248. Roe at 160-61.
249. [d. at 159-61.
250. Casey at 2832. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983);
Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).; Hodgsen v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417 (1990); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
251. Casey at 2832.
252. [d.
253. [d. at 2833.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's group reexamined the "fundamental right" in Roe because the "state of our post-Roe decisional law dealing with the regulation of abortion is confusing
and uncertain. "2114 This group found that "the Roe court reached
too far when it analogized the right to abort a fetus to the rights
involved in Pierce, Meyer, Loving and Griswold 21111 and thereby
deemed the right to abortion fundamental."2118 This group also
focused on the traditional principle of stare decisis 21i7 but opted
to comply with that principle on the group's own terms by declaring that the proper standard for determining the constitutionality of abortion regulations is "minimal scrutiny."2118 Based
on this standard, Chief Justice Rehnquist's group easily upheld
all the provisions at issue. 2119
The sum of the Supreme Court's opinions in this case resulted in new abortion rights law in the United States. States
are now free to restrict a woman's right to pre-viability abortions
provided that such states do not create an undue interference
with that right.
254. [d. at 2854.
255. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the Constitution
protects personal decisions about child rearing and education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that students have a Constitutional right to acquire knowledge);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that marriage is a Constitutional right);
and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the Constitution protects
personal decisions about contraception).
256. Casey at 2860.
257. The Chief Justice's group began its argument by using the Black's Law Dictionary definition of stare decisis: "to abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990). This group then liberally criticized the O'Connor
group's concept of stare decisis. Casey at 2860-67. Next, it stated, "In our view, authentic principles of stare decisis do not require that any portion of the reasoning in Roe be
kept intact ... 'Stare decisis is not ... a universal, inexorable command,' especially in
cases involving interpretation of the Federal Constitution (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil
& Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)." [d. at 2860-61. This statement. about stare decisis was problematic not only because it was not legally binding but
because it conflicted with the definition of stare decisis with which the Chief Justice's
group began this discussion. By having laid this weak foundation for its opinion, this
group needed to present an extremely persuasive argument in the remainder of its opinion to redeem itself intellectually, which it failed to do. The Chief Justice's group overruled Roe based on many more dissenting (non-legally binding) opinions, including the
dissent in Roe. Casey at 2867-73.
258. [d. at 2867. Minimal scrutiny is the standard of review which requires that a
rational relationship between a state regulation and a legitimate state objective exist.
WiJliamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
259. Casey at 2873.
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CONCLUSION

The Irish Court's approach to abortion law was superior to
the American Court's approach in these cases.
The majority of the Irish Court was responding to change in
the public's opinion about abortion. The public felt very deeply
that X should be allowed to abort despite Ireland's firm abortion
law, for which the conservative majority voted in 1983,260 the
one which specifies that abortions be given only when true risks
to the mother's life exist. 261 This risk to the mother's life did not
exist in X. The facts simply could not support that conclusion.
The truth was that it was unfair to force a mere fourteen year
old child to bear a child that was the product of a violent crime.
The majority of the court tried to make its decision by actually
grounding it in the law while, at the same time, responding to
. the public's perception of equity. Although its analysis was
flawed, it tried to fulfill its duty as a public servant while creating an avenue of relief for victims like X. The result of its efforts
was to obscure Ireland's previously clear and solid abortion law.
In Casey, three U.S. Justices (Justice O'Connor's group)
gave lip service to the importance of precedent and to how they
were going to keep Roe intact. These three Justices were surely
aware that the majority of the public thinks favorably of Roe.262
Therefore, they were compelled not to overtly' overturn Roe, realizing that Roe has been an important part of American law for
twenty years and could not easily be thwarted. Seemingly those
three members of the Court felt that "affirming Roe's essential
holding" was enough to appease the large numbers of the population which 'support Roe. But then those three justices not only
debased the basic structure (the trimester scheme) of Roe but
eviscerated it by changing the "strict scrutiny" test (when
checking the validity of a state abortion regulation) to the "undue burden" test. Under this new, less demanding test, abortion
regulations and restrictions will pass muster much more easily
than they would have under Roe's actual test. This group thus
260. See supra note 122.
261. See supra note 32.
262. Ronald Brownstein, The Times Poll; Party Coalition May Be Fracturing
Under Bush, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1992, at AI.
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took away with one hand what it "gave" (i.e., promising to keep
Roe intact) with the other. The only plausible reason for this
troubling decision was the justices' subjective belief that abortion rights should be extremely limited.
Four other justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist's group) sought
to overturn Roe. Their unfavorable views toward Roe were no
secret, and they would criticize any other opinion which did not
overturn Roe. However, they were no more convincing in their
arguments than Justice O'Connor's group. They also alleged respect for stare decisis yet failed to adhere to it, predominantly
basing their decision on dissenting opinions in other cases, including the dissenting opinion in Roe. 263 These dissents did not
carry any precedential value. Chief Justice Rehnquist's group
thereby fulfilled its subjective agenda with respect to abortion.
The combination of the opinions in Casey has not clarified
Roe. If anything, it has made abortion law in the U.S. even more
obscure than it was under Roe's strict scrutiny standard which
had been successfully used by the states for twenty years. The
states must now contend with a new, untested standard. Moreover, Casey has substantially weakened an American woman's
right to privacy in the area of abortion. The final judgment in
Casey has left American women vulnerable to more state interference in their right to procure abortions, especially as conservative legislators create new barriers to abortion and have
them tested by the current Court, the majority of which shares a
conservative ideology.
An important lesson that these two cases teach is that
highly political or moral cases make ambiguous law. Such judicial decisions keep the issues in the political arena, but ultimately the public returns to the legislature or the courts to clarify such laws. 264
263. See supra note 257.
264. Ireland has already held a referendum, regarding abortion, in response to the
Irish Supreme Court's decision in X. The proposed laws purported to liberalize Irish
abortion law in a variety of ways. However, the result of the referendum was unclear.
Both the conservative and liberal factions of the public claimed victory. Alan Murdoch,
Both Sides Claim Victory in Abortion Vote, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 28, 1992, at 1. In
the U.S., courts in Louisiana and Guam questioned what abortion law is in the United
States even after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Casey. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. (1992) (issue
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The most remarkable aspects about X and Casey are their
ironic outcomes. On one hand, Ireland is a Catholic country with
a Constitution that honors religion and gives the Catholic
Church a special position.28~ The Irish Constitution expressly
opposes abortion (which is clearly a Catholic position) in all but
the most extreme situations. Yet, the Irish Supreme Court decided in X to allow an unlikely candidate to procure an abortion. Its conclusion was humanitarian and respectful of this girl's
individual liberty and reproductive freedom. The majority of the
Irish justices made this controversial decision despite Ireland's
Catholic paternalistic nature.
On the other hand, the U.S. Constitution shuns established
religion,288 and "[n]o right is held more sacred or is more carefully guarded by the common law than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others. . . . "287 Regardless of
these "traditions," the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in Casey,
that a state can severely restrict a woman's right to terminate a
pregnancy. The true reason for the U.S. Supreme Court's upholding the restrictions reviewed in Casey stems from its adherence to the Christian belief that a fetus is a "life" (rather than a
"potential life" - a non-moralistic, non-religious view of a fetuS).288 The Court thus regulated American morality on the
abortion issue under the guise of Constitutional mandate. In deciding Casey in this manner, it raised the Constitution to the
level of a religious instrument which caused the Constitution to
violate itself i.e., the Fourteenth Amendment. Now, women's reproductive rights and freedom can be scrutinized and regulated
much more strictly than many other medical procedures - even
more serious and life-threatening ones. This is clearly violative
was whether Guam's total ban on abortion, except in medical emergencies, was facially
unconstitutional). Sojourner v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992) (concerned Louisiana Abortion Statute which criminalized abortions except under extremely limited
circumstances).
265. The Irish Constitution provides, "The State acknowledges that the homage of
public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence and shall
respect and honor religion. The State recognizes the special position of the Holy Catholic
Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens." IR. CONST. art. 44, § 1 (1-2).
266. See supra note 242.
267. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
268. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
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of the United States' purported anti-religious establishment and
pro-individual liberties position.
Apparently, even a Catholic country like Ireland is progressing in the area of individual liberties by making its anti-abortion
law more liberal. The United States, however, is regressing in
this area by allowing the states to greatly restrict and interfere
with its previously liberal abortion laws. Ironically, the laissezfaire United States could learn a lesson from paternalistic
Ireland.
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